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The Primacy Of Experience For Verified
Knowledge In Roger Bacon
Bernard A. Gendreau

The philosophical problematic about experience presupposes an awareness of
the great variety of meanings used in designating the term experience and of the
fundamental diversity of roles assigned to it. 1 A concern with experience as a
means of developing man in his consciousness as a reflective human being
encountering the world of being through lived experience and in his awareness
as an observer intentionally taking possession of the world of objective reality
in a knowing experience leaves man with a strong impression that, although
experience might be considered a weasel word, at once shifty and slippery, as
Dewey liked to remind us,2 it still might be considered as rich in the variety of
opportunities it offers man in his self-development. Shifts in methodological
interests and in epistemological positions have introduced different conceptions
of what experience involves and have given way to different evaluations to the
role of experience in enhancing man's endeavors. Experience might make the
difference between fact and fiction, between certainty and doubt, between authenticity and facticity. Then, experience has a prime function in man's life. 3
On the other hand, experience might appear to be too primitive, subjective and
unsophisticated to compete effectively with rational demonstrations and creative
projections, with ideological exigencies and technological achievements. Experience
might not cut very deep in our computerized and depersonalized world. 4
It becomes useful to be in contact with philosophers who have made an option
in favor of experience as having a valid and meaningful role in the human enterprise. Philosophizing in history as a part of our effort at determining the meaning
and meaningfulness of experience becomes indispensable if we want to understand experience in the proper contribution it can make in enriching man's life.
Knowing what experience has been understood to be, how it has been put to use
and what consequences it has brought about could help us in our own option
for or against experience.
Finding a man like Roger Bacon, who shows an untiring enthusiasm for experience as the indispensable condition for human achievement and who acquired
an enviable reputation as a promoter and achiever in things experiential, we
might very well wonder what there might be in Roger Bacon for us in our
concern with experience as having a role in our life and culture. Roger Bacon
(c. 1219/ 20-1294) has a place of choice among seekers for certainty in the Middle
Ages. 5 His so-called scientific and modernistic attitude toward knowledge have
made of him a unique figure among Mediaeval thinkers. His sympathy for the
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scientific method and his high opinion toward the role of experimental sciences
and experience with regard to the acquisition and certification of a knowledge
that would be at once complete in truth and certain in assent have given him,
in the past, the reputation of being a precocious forerunner of modern methods
of science.6 Further research and a better acquaintance with mediaeval thinkers
and with Roger Bacon have made it clear that Bacon did not stand alone in his
respect and admiration for positive sciences and that his actual modernity has
to be subjected to close scrutiny.7 Roger Bacon remains an enigmatic personality
merging the characteristics of a man of science, a philosopher, a theologian and a
mystic. It turns out that Roger Bacon was in fact much more a child of his age
than he himself and his historians have thought him to be. s A study of his
contribution might reveal not only the value of his own insights on experience,
but might also furnish us with a broader perspective for our problematic about
experience.
Roger Bacon, who stands as a classical example of the propagandist for experience, makes a special contribution to the problem of experience by his
emphasis on the primacy of experience to justify the certainty of assent to
verified knowledge. "Et ut certitudinaliter sine dubitatione, et plane sine obscuritate, tradatur sapientia, quod impossibile est fieri sine experientia."9 This commitment to experience finds its expression within the context and perspective of the
Thirteenth Century mediaeval concern for truth, not only understood in its
objectivity and grasped in its explanatory causes through a demonstrative
reasoning, but also seen in its evidence and assented to with the certainty which
excludes doubt and leads the mind to rest in its inquiry. "Argumentum concludit
et facit nos concedere conclusion em, sed non certificat neque removet dub itationem, ut quiescat animus in intuitu veritatis, nisi eam inveniat via experientiae."l0
Evidence becomes a basic condition for the satisfaction of the mind in the grasping
of the object.
Roger Bacon shares with Bonaventure, Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aquinas,
his contemporaries, in the typically mediaeval intellectualist attitude seeking rest
for the mind in its search for truth through the discovery of truth certified in its
evidence.11 But Roger Bacon, contrary to some of his contemporaries, maintains
that experience, and only experience, will produce the fullness of evidence that
will terminate the mind's inquiry with certainty in the possession of truth. "Sed
sola experientia perfecta facit animum quiescere in luce veritatis."12 The very
nature and aspiration of the mind demands experience.
Roger Bacon's further contribution is his emphasis on the experiential in relation
to the empirical phenomena of nature in the natural sciences. 13 He is of his
times, like many of his contemporaries, Robert Grosseteste, Adam Marsh or Peter
of Maricourt, to name those he admired most, in being an experientialist involved
in the empirical and in the experimental and concerned with the theoretical and
practical implications of external sense experience serving to bring out in
evidence the truth involved either directly or through the use of instruments. 14
The primacy given to certification through direct sense experience and through
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the use of instruments did not result into an empmclsm excluding the role of
reasoning to conclude to truth or the presence of a higher form of experience
as a help in certifying the truth about both the physical and spiritual world of
reality. In spite of his emphasis on experience and especially on sense experience,
Roger Bacon, along with all his contemporaries in the Thirteenth Century,
developed a philosophical synthesis on the metaphysical intellectualist level. The
corpus of Roger Bacon's thought involves a doctrinal synthesis with the basic
philosophical and metaphysical components alongside a body of scientific inventions and findings .IS
The meaningfulness of Roger Bacon's contribution to experimental science and
to a science of experience lies primarily on the side of the theoretician of the
methodology of experience in the natural sciences, rather than on the side of the
practitioner of experimental science. 16 Roger Bacon was aware, thanks to Aristotle,
of the importance of first establishing a sound method of inquiry, before undertaking the elaboration of an organized knowledge .17 In all this, Roger Bacon
should be judged in the light of the historical context in which he developed
his insight and of the historical development of the meaning and the role given
to experience by various philosophers and scientists through the ages. The
praising or debunking of Roger Bacon's contribution to philosophical analysis
and scientific achievement depends a lot on the status of experience at a particular culture. Roger Bacon goes up and down with the fate and fortune of
empiricism. The centrality of experience has been interpreted diversely according
to the temper of the times and according to the prevailing primordial insight or
paradigm at work in philosophical speculation and scientific research. IS
Experience is one of the basic ingredients of human life. Man through his lived
experience and through his knowing experience is able to take a hold of himself
and find a place for himself in the world. Through experience man acquires an
expertise to cope with the human situation in thought, in action and in work.
Experience as the repetition of acts and the involvement with the situation is a
training ground for efficiency and mastery in activity. Through experience man
develops, as it were, a second nature as a principle of his operations. As Aristotle
has it, through experience man discovers the universal out of the individual data
given in perception, retained in memory and developed in experience and comes
to universal judgments. 19 This becomes the foundation for science in knowing,
wisdom in doing and skills in making. For Roger Bacon, experience in this context
furnishes a knowledge of the highest value prior to and without the use of the
reasoning process and makes it possible for man to be at home with the world
of reality by possessing the skills, the science and the wisdom to assure results
which imply consequences beneficial to man, society and the Church.2o Thus
without the benefit of the reasoning process which normally gives the truth of
things with explanation and cause, man can achieve, through experience alone,
a deep understanding of reality with a grasp of its rationale and cause. 21 Being
experienced is the condition for efficient achievement in promoting the causes
mankind and the Church are called to . The primary role played by the experiential
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science he intended to create, promote and develop is for the sake of peace of
mind in certainty in the individual and of harmony of order in truth in society.22
Thus experience which gives the evidence not only for the bare fact, but also for
the reason and cause of the fact serves as a basis for a wisdom in depth which
in its experiential basis compares favorably with a wisdom acquired through
demonstrative knowledge.
Through experience man is able to be in contact with men and things . Experience
furnishes man with the means and criterion for self-appropriation and self-mastery
in the assimilation of things in knowing and the participation with others in living.
Without experience man is left alone to himself estranged from the world and
alienated from people. He remains frustrated in his attempts at self-fulfillment and
self-realization, self-affirmation and self-evaluation, self-discovery and self-manifestation. Through experience persons encounter persons to create a community
of persons. Experience reveals the self and leads to the discovery of others. A
politics of experience and an experiential personalism lead man to authenticity
through interexperience. 23 In spite of his great concern for society and especially
for the Church, for propaganda and for communication, for influencing and converting others, Roger Bacon does not seem to emphasize this type of experience
which would offer the evidence of the self and of the other as subject and
develop the community as a fertile ground for meaningful personal and communal
experience. The basic approach to experience is objectivistic with an emphasis
on the knowing about the thing out there in the evidence it furnishes as a fact
corresponding to our understanding of it. Being a witness in experiencing is not
the issue. Being witnessed by a knower having an experience reaching out to the
thing in the splendor of its truth is the issue.
Through experience things become available to man to be recognized in what
they are in their nature and to be judged in what they appear to be in ' their
existence. Experience deals with the seen and the heard, the felt and the witnessed.
Experience involves awareness and intuition, immediacy and contact. Experience
implies presence and evidence. Knowledge of things is acquired through experience
and experience serves as judge to give assurance about the facts. Thus, an experiential science of perceivable phenomena leads man to the objective world of
nature. Experience leads to a grasp of the universal in the particular, of the
principle in the given, of the pattern in the flow of things. Experience serves to
assure certainty about the factual universal in the contingent. Thus experience
gives truth in content and certainty in assent.
Roger Bacon's experiential method is operative within the framework of
Aristotelian logic and the perspective of intellectualist speculation. His emphasis
upon experience as the indispensable condition for evidence needed to put the
mind to rest in the possession of truth with certainty does not lead him to
consider experience as the only means of knowing the truth , of reaching causal
explanation and of drawing necessary conclusions. 24 His interpretation of Aristotle
leads to a method of inquiry which recognizes the validity and value proper to
the reasoning process to establish the truth in its causal connection and in its
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logical necessity. "Argumentum persuadet de veritate, sed non certificat."25 But,
to exclude doubt, to avoid wavering, to overcome indifference and to do away with
obscurity, it is necessary to have experience to make the truth so obvious and so
meaningful, that it becomes relevant and operative, undeniable and unavoidable,
valuable and influential. In this case, experience does not furnish the knowledge
of the content as to what it is that is true, but adds the evidence which brings
about the firm assent of certainty to terminate the inquiry and to motivate the
taking seriously of what is implied. "Nam argumentum ut demonstratio concludit
veritatem conclusionis cui non potest homo resistere, sed non propter earn
quiescit ejus animus in luce veritatis: yme exigitur experientia, et tune tenetur
veritas sine murmure et titubatione."26 The firm and satisfied adhering to the
truth of the conclusion thus presupposes not only the demonstrative reasoning,
but also experience. "Sine experientia conclusionum nunquam fit scientia."27
Instead of a notional assent on the basis of the intelligibility offered in the reasoning process, the problem in Roger Bacon is to reach a real assent, perhaps in
Newman's sense,28 on the basis of the overpowering evidence a properly achieved
experience forces us to face up to. Then we would not neglect the argument, but
cleave to the conclusion. Then also we would take heed of the implied consequences of the truth discovered and avoid what is harmful and follow what is
beneficial.29 Thus the problem for Roger Bacon is not simply to recognize the
truth involved in the data under consideration, but to have this truth become real
to the knower as clearly factual and cogently imperative. What experience does
for man is to make available a truth which makes a difference and brings about
results.
Experience which makes knowledge both available and effective by furnishing
a solid basis for the truth and evidence overcoming doubt and doing away with
obscurities is twofold: the physical experience through exterior senses coming in
contact with the facts in the world of phenomena within our reach and the spiritual
experience through an interior illumination bringing man insights beyond those
available in his existential condition in the sensible and material world. 3o The
human and philosophical experience achieved through perception through exterior
senses is carried through either through the use of instruments for objects at a
distance or through direct vision. The homo faber appears in Roger Bacon and
becomes a basic condition in achieving scientific experience. Man's creativity in
completing himself through instruments for greater efficiency is a basic interest
of Roger Bacon. As a researcher, it was a constant concern of his both because
of problems of cost and of availability. Scientific hardware appears constantly
as a basic item for experience which need be subsidized by benefactors, government or Church. Progress in scientific inquiry depends to a great extent on the
making of instruments to be used to bring about the experience needed for certification of scientific findings. Availability of the data was also a basic problem.
The distance within our world between the researcher and the evidence could be
overcome by appealing to vicarious experience from those who traveled to these
parts of the world. The time between occurrences of events could be overcome
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only by waiting it out until the return of the phenomenon.
The use of mathematics was indispensable to furnish arguments leading to the
truth. 3! The value of mathematics as a demonstrative science still required experience to certify and finalize mathematical conclusions. These verified and
certified truths could then be put to use in the development of optics and of
experimental science. The use of instruments was indispensable to complete the
experiments needed to achieve the experience for the certification of truth. The
acceptance of eye-witnesses and hearsay reports as well as of authoritative
revelations remains in Roger Bacon a preliminary step often indispensable to the
verification in reason and certification in experience of the truth involved. The
primacy of experience as an individual activity performed with regard to individual
events never loses out in the face of his great admiration for mathematics, his
sympathy for the finding of others and his openness to a higher form of revelation.
Thus belief, reason and experience remain three stages in the development of an
organized knowledge which is given a start with the help of information furnished
by witnesses or authorities which are trustworthy, develops through the help of
rational discourse with the use of mathematical insights and finds its completion
through the experience which gives the ultimate evidence for the truth and facts
believed in to start with and then reasoned to. "Et ut certitudinaliter sine dubitatione, et plane sine obscuritate, tradatur sapientia, quod, impossibile est fieri sine
experientia. Quia licet per tria sciamus videlicet per auctoritatem, et rationem, et
experientiam, tamen auctoritas non sapit nisi detur ejus ratio, nec dat intellectum
sed credulitatem; credimus enim auctoritati , sed non propter earn intelligimus. Nec
ratio potest scire an sophisma vel demonstratio, nisi conclusionem sciamus experi
per opera, ut inferius in scientiis experimentalibus demonstrabo ."32
The primacy of experience in the process of learning and of verifying made it
imperative to set up a special science of experience or a special field of experiental science over and above the already established fields of inquiry, language,
mathematics and optics. Thus Roger Bacon, the theoretician of experience sets out
to develop what he calls "scientia experimentalis."33 While he is making every
effort to practice experimental science in a most effective way, faced that he is
with difficulties of lack of time, absence of help, paucity of money, deprivation
of freedom and inadequacy of instruments, Roger Bacon takes very seriously his
role of advocate and propagandist of the value and usefulness of experimental
science. When dealing with Roger Bacon's contribution to the meaning and uses
of experience we should keep in mind the distinction between his achievement in
developing a theory and a methodology of experimental science and his success
at scientific research in trying to create a developed body of scientific verified
truths. He can hold his own on both counts. This is true especially if we take
into account the progress and evolution of scientific theories and achievements.
While recognizing the basic contribution of the other sciences in the reasoning
process used by them in their own development and the use they can be put
to in the reasoning process of other fields of inquiry, Roger Bacon intended to
set up a special methodology for knowledge through experience. Such a science
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is not primarily concerned with furnishing arguments and rational proofs in the
way the other sciences do. Experimental science in Roger Bacon functions at a
second level which presupposes done the work of the other sciences at a first
level of operation. The primary role of experimental science is to use experience
as a means of promoting and enriching knowledge by determining the value in
certainty of the conclusions of the other sciences, by extending the conclusions
of other sciences beyond what other sciences could prove and achieve and by
putting to use the achievements of the other sciences and dealing with new data
not implied in other sciences. Thus experimental science has a special place
above and beyond the other sciences in completing them through its function of
certifying the truth already reasoned to, of projecting new insights beyond insights
already reached and of applying the results already arrived at to further practical
use. 34 These constitute the three prerogatives which give value and meaningfulness
to experimental science.
The first prerogative of experimental science is the role of verification to bring
out the finalizing evidence to the truth discovered in the other sciences through
reasoning process. Experimental science thus serves the other form of knowledge
by bringing them to full fruition. This first function of experimental science
consists in determining the conditions of experience and to produce experiences
in order to bring about certainty to the results or conclusions of reasoning process
of other sciences. These conclusions contain the truth, but do not give certainty
prior to experience since experience is needed to furnish the evidence that
excludes doubts. Examples given for the need of experience to furnish real
finalized knowledge which would make the knower fully aware of the truth and
of the implications are the case of fire with its feature of burning and the case
of a mathematical conclusion about the triangle. Demonstration in either case is
insufficient to bring about a real assent beyond doubt and indifference. This is so,
as Roger Bacon stresses, in spite of the fact that mathematical reasons are the
most powerful in furnishing a demonstrative argument for the truth of a conclusion.35 Roger Bacon also brings in as examples the problems around the rainbow
and the halo of spheres to illustrate the role of experimental science in the fields
of mathematical optics and physical phenomena. Besides these instances where
experimental science through furnishing of the experience proves the conclusions
arrived at to be right, other instances are given where the purpose of experiences
was to prove the previous assumptions to have been incorrect. The cutting of
diamonds with blood, the use of the beaver's testicles and the freezing of water
are cases where experiments prove the theories advocated to be wrong.
The second prerogative of experimental science is to correlate the conclusions
of various sciences and to bring new proofs and new conclus ions which could not
be developed within the original sciences although the potential for the new conclusions were contained there. 36 Experimental science thus appears as a synthetic
science unifying and prolonging the achievements of other fields of learning. The
point here is that further development in the knowledge is achieved through
experience rather than through simply a reasoning process. The experience in
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this case gives new insights about reality and furnishes the equivalent of what
amounts to proofs in the other sciences. It is both coordinating and creative in
relation to other sciences. A group of scientists, each working on his own in his
own field, can be made to make a contribution to the whole if experimental
science is at work to coordinate these activities and to pursue them to further
conclusions which were not within the reach or range of any determinate field
of inquiry but which were in a way already possibilities in the conclusions already
reached. This prerogative of experimental science as a synthetic science might be
considered as an integrating science which bring together our knowledge to a
higher efficiency by coordinating the already realized achievements and to bring
about beyond this further progress. Examples for the second prerogative are the
functioning of the astrolabe in the field of mathematics, the prolongation of life
in medicine and the magnet and other minerals in alchemy.37
The third prerogative of experimental science is the further use that knowledge
can be put to. It consists in taking as given the conclusions of other sciences
and bringing out the applications and the uses they could have for man , society
and the Church. 38 For the practically-minded Roger Bacon this third prerogative is
of the highest value since it brings through experience the whole range of the
sciences to their fruition in the practical order. Experience is here at work through
the engineer, the practical scientist and the technician who put to use the principles
discovered and justified in the other sciences. The services rendered by the other
sciences lead here to the determination of future events and to the discovery of
the marvels of nature and the workings of art. The knowledge from astronomy
becomes useful when put to use through experience in predicting future events. The
functioning of magnets and other minerals in Alchemy also finds place under this
third prerogative. The usefulness of experimental science to the Church brings us
to the value of experimental science through moral philosophy. Thus through this
third prerogative human knowledge through experience finds its full meaningfulness in reaching to the proper uses it can be put to in a way which involves the
presence of forceful and determining evidence for the workings going on. Experimental science by guiding the activities of other sciences as subsidiaries in bringing
about the effects intended assures man of efficiency and worth in his enterprise.
toEt haec scientia certificat omnia naturalia et artificialia in particulari et in
propria disciplina, per experientiam perfectam ; non per argumenta ut scientiae
pure speculativae, nec per debiles et imperfectas experientias, ut scientiae operativae. Et ideo hac est domina omnium scientiarum praecedentium et finis totius
speculationis."39 The science of experience thus keeps its value in stressing the
primacy of experience for verified knowledge.
Roger Bacon thus appears as the champion of verification through sense experience as a means of reaching to the evidence needed to justify absolute certainty not only within the various realms of scientific inquiry and practical technology, but also within the special areas assigned to the separate science of
experience called experimental science. The central contribution made by Roger
Bacon to the history of science is his elaborate analysis of the methodological role
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of this special experimental science with its variety of levels of achievements in
enhancing knowledge both in content of truth and in value of certainty through
experience.
The methodological works of Roger Bacon were written in the middle of the
thirteenth century at the height of the scholastic endeavor at developing a speculative intellectualist synthesis through the use of reflective intelligence and
demonstrative reason in the spirit of Aristotle. Roger Bacon stands at the crossroad of the development of the scholastic method. The Platonic Augustinian
methodology was vieing with the Aristotelian Arabian methodology for dominance
in the learning process of the schools. Greek and Arab science was taking a hold
in the Christian West. Roger Bacon was very much aware of the speculative
activities of Alexander of Hales, William of Auvergne, Bonaventure, Albert the
Great and Thomas Aquinas and of the experimental activities of Robert Grosseteste, Adam Marsh and Peter of Maricourt. He developed his own theory of science
at a time when there was a common concern for intellectual methodology in
theology, philosophy and science. His option for the primacy of experience for
verified knowledge to be achieved with certainty in evidence was deliberate and
knowledgeable. He was very much aware of the errors and shortcomings arising
from a philosophical and theological methodology which excluded experience and
experimental science. He saw clearly that experience was an indispensable condition for certainty and efficacy in knowledge. Roger Bacon in stressing this thus
made a worthwhile contribution to the problematic of experience.

Xavier University
NOTES
lCf. Mortimer Adler, Ed., The Great Ideas, A SyllIopicoll of Great Books ill the Western
World (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1952), I , 468-475. Cf. ibid ., p. 468: "These
are some of the myriad meanings of 'experience'-not all those which occur with major emphasis in the tradition of the great books. No author uses the word in all these senses. Some
of these senses are contradictory. According to the context of the discussion or the subjectmatter under consideration, the same author will shift from one meaning to another."
Cf. James M. Baldwin, Ed., Dictiollary of Philosophy alld Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1925) , I, 360: "The word is used so vaguely and ambiguously by writers in
philosophy that definition is difficult." Cf. Alan Pasch. Experiellce and the Allalytic (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958) , p. vii: " Back to experience" is the slogan of philosophic
empiricism in modern times .. . It points too, to what is paradoxical about empiricism, for the
more vigorously and conscientiously empiricists have tried to work out their position the
further that position has become removed from anything easily recognizable as experience."
Cf. John E. Smith, Religion alld Empiricism, Aquinas Lecture, 1967 (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1967) , p. 2: "The fundamental idea of experience as both the substance of
philosophical thought and the criterion of its validity, proved itself to be a persistent one. The
idea and the doctrines through which it found expression, came to be developed in several
different directions so that, in addition to what I shall call 'classical empiricism'-the characteristic position of Locke and, in a different way, of Hume--other forms of the appeal to
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experience have appeared in response to new problems and interests. Logical empiricism,
linguistic empiricism, pragmatic empiricism and radical empiricism are the names for these
new philosophical standpoints. Despite profound differences between them, all are committed
to the proposition that something called experience is, to paraphrase Dewey, the ultimate
arbiter of all questions of fact and existence."
2Cf. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court, 1926), p. 1: "As Ralph Perry
has said, experience is a weasel word. Its slipperiness is evident in an inconsistency characteristic of modern thinkers. On the one hand, they eagerly claim an empiricist method:
they foreswear the a priori and transcendent; they are sensitive to the charge that they employ
data unwarranted by experience. On the other hand, they are given to deprecating the conception of experience; experience it is said, is purely subjective, and whoever takes experience
for his subject-matter is logically bound to land in the most secluded of idealisms." Cf. Gerd
Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Oxford; Basil Blakwell, 1969), p.
328, fn. 5: "A term like 'empirical' is systematically ambiguous. Its significance may range
from the unanalyzed commonsense of the physical scientist, via Hume's use of 'experience'
as designating the level of 'impressions', to that which it is given in the Kantian notion of
'empirical reality', when contrasted with 'transcendental ideality'."
3Cf. R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience (New York: Ballantine Books, 1967), p. 17:
"Even facts become fiction without adequate ways of seeing 'the facts'. We do not need
theories so much as the experience that is the source of the theory. We are not satisfied with
faith, in the sense of an implausible hypothesis irrationally held: we demand to experience
the 'evidence'." Cf. Roger Bacon, Compendium Studii Philosophiae, ch. 1 (1. S. Brewer, Ed.,
Fr. Roged Bacon Opera Quaedam Hactenus [nedita, Rolls Series (London, Kraus Reprint
Ltd., 1965) p. 397: "Et ut certitudinaliter sine dubitatione, et plane sine obscuritate, tradatur
sapientia, quod impossibile est fieri sine experientia. Quia licet per tria sci am us, videlicet per
auctoritatem, et rationem, et experientiam, tamen auctoritas non sapit nisi detur ejus ratio,
nec dat intellectum sed credulitatem; credimus eliim auctoritati, sed non propter earn intelligimus. Nec ratio potest scire an sophism a vel demonstratio, nisi conclusionem sciamus
experiri per opra, ut inferius in scientiis experimentalibus demonstrabo. "
4Cf. P. L. Heath, "Experience," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967, III, 156: "The mere
empiric cuts, and continues to cut, a poor figure even into the modern period ... The preference for rational certainty over mere empirical generalization is in fact endemic to philosophers ... But the attempt to reconstitute ordinary experience out of a mixture of sense data
and formal logic, though long and ably sustained, has met in the end with little more success
than the search for certainty that led to the introduction of these data in the first place."
Cf. D. J. B. Hawkins, The Criticism of Experience (London : Sheed & Ward, 1947) , p. vi:
"The view that the first task of philosophy is to provide a criticism of experience is dominant
especially in the classical line of philosophers writing in English, in Locke, Berkeley and
Hume, in Reid a nd Hamilton, and, in our own day, in G. E. Moore and thinkers of similar
inspiration . .. The vital period of development in the criticism of experience comprises
roughly the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from Descartes to Kant on the Continent
and to Reid and Hamilton in these islands."
sCf. Christopher Dawson, "The Significance of Roger Bacon," The Month , IX (1953) , 47-52.
Cf. J. H. Weispheil, "Roger Bacon," New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967, XII, 552-553. Cf.
Allen B. Wolter, "Roger Bacon," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967, II, 240-242. Cf.
Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, (New York: Random
House, 1955) pp. 294-312. For an adequate presentation of the life and works of Roger
Bacon, cf. Theodore Crowley, Roger Bacon, The Problem of the Soul in his Philosophical
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Commentaries (Louvain: Institut Superieur de Philosophie & Dublin: Duffy, 1950) . Cf. also
Stewart C. Easton, Roger Bacon and his Search for a Universal Science (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1952).
6Cf. E. Charles, Roger Bacoll, sa vie, ses ouvrages et ses doctrines (Paris, 1861). Cf. C.
Narbey, "Le moine Roger Bacon et Ie mouvement scientifique au XIII ieme siec1e," Revue
des questiolls historiques, XXXV (1884) 115-116. Cf. Robert Adamson, Roger Bacon and
the Philosophy of Science in the Middle Ages, in Roger Bacoll, Essays . • . on the Occasion
of the Commemoration of the Seventh Centellary of his Birth, (Oxford, 1914), pp. 1-32.
Cf. J. H. Bridges, The Life and Work of Roger Bacoll (London, 1914). Cf. also Robert
Adamson, Roger Bacon, Encyclopedia Britallllica, 13th ed. , 1926, III, p. 155: "The 13th
century, an age peculiarly rich in great men, produced few, if any, who can take higher rank
than Roger Bacon. He is in every way worthy to be placed beside Albertus Magnus,
Bonaventura, and Thomas Aquinas. Those had an infinitely wider renown in their day, but
modern criticism has restored the balance in his favour, and is even in danger of erring in
the opposite direction. Bacon, it is now said, was not appreciated by his age because he
was in advance of it; he is no schoolman, but a modern thinker, whose conceptions of
science are more just and clear than are even those of his more celebrated namesake. In this
view there is certainly some truth, but it is much exaggerated."
7Cf. Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic alld Experimental Sciellce (New York: Macmillan,
1929), II, pp. 616-691. Cf. Ibid., p. 649: "Our preceding chapters have similarly rectified
the place of Bacon's discussion of experimental science in the history of thought. We have
already brought out the fact that he was not the first medieval man to advocate experimentation, but that writers before him contain 'experiments,' rely on experience of other 'experimenters' and 'experimental books.' We have noted Petrus Hispanus' discussion of the
'experimental method' (via experimenti), Albertus Magnus' experimental school for the study
of nature, Robert Grosseteste's association of experimentation with physics, and William of
Auvergne's association of experiment with natural magic. We have described experiments of
Constantin us Africanus, Adelard of Bath, Pedro Alfonso, Bernard Silvester, and many others.
We have yet to describe experimental books, many of which antedate Roger Bacon. His
discussion will be found to do little more than duplicate and reinforce the picture of the
medieval status of experimental method which we have already obtained from other and
earlier sources. He is not a lone herald of the experimental method of modern science; He
merely reveals and himself represents the merits and the defects of an important movement
of his time." Cf. G . Sarton, Introduction to th e History of Science, (Baltimore: Williams &
Wilkins, 1931 ) , II, pp. 952-967 . Cf. Christopher D awson , "The Significance of Roger Bacon,"
The MOllth , IX (1953) , p. 47: "The fa me of Roger Bacon is one of the curiosities of history ... But it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century with Brewer's publication of the Opera Inedita in 1859 and E. Charles' biography in 1861 that Bacon came into
his own as a thinker. He was not only recognized as one of the most original minds of his
age, he was hailed as an asserter of the freedom of thought in a n age of authority, a martyr
of science and a prophet of modern ideas. The closer and more accurate study of Bacon's
thought which has been made possible by the work of scholars like Robert Steele and A. G.
Little during the last fifty years has shown the errors and anachronisms of these views and
has proved that Roger Bacon was in many respects a traditionalist of the traditionalists.
ConsequentlY' there has been in recent years a sharp reaction to the extravagant claims of
Bacon's admirers."
SCf. G . Delorme, "Roger Bacon," Dictiollnaire de Theologie CatllOlique, 1910, n , pp. 6-31.
Cf. D . E . Sharp, "Roger Bacon ," En cyclopedia Britallnica, 14th ed., 1938, II, pp. 889-890.
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Cf. Theodore Crowley, "Roger Bacon," Encyclopedia Britannica, 1966, pp. 1000-1001. Cf.
Charles Singer, A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1959) , p. 171: "Despite all this Bacon must not be considered as a man born out of his
time. On the contrary, he was in many ways very typical of the scholastic movement and
an important link in the chain of scholastic scientific development. He regarded the advancement of science as important for the support of religion. That he was in trouble with his
superiors, there can be no doubt, but to suggest that those differences were caused by his
scientific views is not only to go beyond the facts but beyond probability."
9Compendium Studii Philosophiae, I (Brewer) p. 397.
100pus Majus, Book VI, chapter 1 (John H. Bridges, Ed ., Th e Opus Majus of Roger Bacon
(Frankfort im Main : Minerva Gerrnibah. Reprint, 1964) vol. II, p. 167.
lICf. Bernard A. Gendreau, "The Unity of the Mediaeval Intellectual Attitude," in Studium
Generale, Studies Offered by Astrik L. Gabriel, Ed. by L. S. Domonkos and R. J. S.
Schneider (Notre Dame: The Mediaeval Institute of the University of Notre Dame, 1967),
pp. 57-107. Cf. Ibid., p. 107 : "We strove to show that the unifying principle consists in a
common intellectual attitude which is found realized in a different way in each individual
thinker. This attitude consists in the full awareness of the necessity of pursuing, within and
not outside of or independently of the framework of the data of revealed truths and the
state of the absolute certitude given through faith, an enlightened quest for the certainty of
truths grasped in their evidence and intelligibility through rational insight and clear understanding." Cf. also Bernard A. Gendreau, "The Quest for Certainty in Bonaventure," Franciscan Studies, XXI (1961) , pp. 104-227 .
12F. A. Gasquet, "An Unpublished Fragment of a Work by Roger Bacon," English Historical
R eview, XII (1897), p. 510.
l30pus Majus, VI, ch. 1 (Bridges), pp. 167-168: "Qui ergo vult sine demonstratione gaudere
de veritatibus rerum, oportet quod experientiae sciat vacare; et hoc patet ex exemplis. Nam
multa scribunt auctores, et vulgus tenet per argumenta quae fingit sine experientia, quae sunt
omnino falsa ... Oportet ergo omnia certificari per viam experientiae." Cf. Charles Singer,
From Magic To Science, Essays on the Scientific T wiligh t (New York : Dover, 1958), pp.
92-93: "It may be convenient to give a summary of the scientific achievements of Roger
Bacon, the greatest of the Franciscan group and the first man of science in the modem sense.
1. He attempted to set forth a system of natural knowledge. This system was far in advance
of his time, and its basis was observation and experiment. He was clearly the first man in
modern Europe of whom this can be said. 2. He was the first to see the need for the accurate
study of foreign and ancient languages. He attempted grammars of Greek and Hebrew along
definite scientific lines. He also projected a grammar of Arabic. Moreover, he laid down
those lines of textual criticism which have only been developed within the last century.
3. He not only discussed the nature of the experimental method, but was himself an
experimenter . .. Summed up, his legacy to thought may be regarded as accuracy of method,
criticism of authority, and reliance on experiment-the pillars of modern science. But was
not an isolated phenomenon, but an important link in the chain of scientific development."
14Cf. Christopher Dawson, "The Significance of Roger Bacon," Th e Month , IX (1953) , p. 51:
"Against the purely logical and metaphysical culture of the 'vulgus philosophancium Pariis,'
Bacon appeals to what seems to him the wider and deeper learning of his own people-the
'anglicani qui satis inter alios homines sunt et fuerunt studisi,' and above all to their two
greatest representatives, Robert Grosseteste and Adam Marsh, who were the greatest clerks
in the world and the most perfect in science, human and divine." Cf. Roger Bacon, Opus
Tertium, ch. 23 (J. S. Brewer, Ed., Fr. R ogeri Baconis Opera Quaedam Hactenus Inedita,
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Rolls Series (London: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1965) p. 75. Cf. also Ibid. , c. 13 (Brewer), p. 43.
Cf. analysis of scientifically-minded contemporaries and friends of Roger Bacon in Stewart C.
Easton, Roger Bacon and His Search for a Universal Science, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), pp. 88 ff.
IsCf. Opus Majus, VI, ch. 1 (Bridges), p. 169: "Sed duplex est experientia; una ester sensus
exteriores, et sic experimenta ea, quae in coele sunt per instrumenta ad haec facta, et haec
inferiora per opera certificata ad visum experimum . . . Et haec experientia est humana et
philosophica, quantum homo potest facere secundum gratiam ei datam; sed haec experientia
non sufficit homini, quia non plene certificat de corporalibus propter sui difficultatem, et de
spiritualibus nihil attingit. Ergo opertet quod intellectus hominis aliter juvetur, et ideo sancti
patriarchae et prophetae, qui primo dederunt scientias munde, receperunt illuminationes
interiores et non solum stabant in sensu. Et similiter multi post Christum fideles. Nam gratia
fidei illuminat multum, et divinae inspirationes, non solum in spiritualibus, sed corporalibus
et scientiis philosophiae; secundum quod Ptolemaeus dicit in Centilogio quod duplex est via
deveniendi ad notitiam rerum, una per experientiam philosophiae, alia per divinam
inspirationem quae longe melior est, ut dct." Cf. Raoul Carton, L'experience physique chez
Roger Bacon, Etudes de philosophie medievale, vo\. III (Paris: Vrin, 1924). Cf. Id.,
L'experience mystique de l'lIumination interieure chez Roger Bacon, Etudes de philosophie
medievale, vol. III (Paris: Vrin, 1924). Cf. Id., La synthese doctrinale de Roger Bacon,
Etudes de philosophie medievale, vol. X, (Paris: Vrin, 1924) .
16Cf. Charles Singer, A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1959) , p. 171: "He made an appeal, verbose, diffuse, yet definite, for the encouragement
of the experimental spirit. He was not himself an experimenter or mathematician, but like
Grosseteste he saw that without experimentation and without mathematics, natural philosophy
is but verbiage." George Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science, Vol. II (Baltimore:
Williams and Wilkins, 1931) p. 953 and 959.
17Compendium Studii Ph ilosophiae, ch. 1 (Brewer), p. 397: "Sed ad omnia scienda modus
optimus requiritur. Aristoteles vere in secundo Metaphysicae vult, quod modus sciendi
requiratur, antequam homo discat vel per se inquirat. Malum enim est, ut ait, simul quaerere
scientiam et modum sciendi, quia primo quaerere debet modum, ut feliciter ad scientiam
perveniat. Quod si non faciat, erit similis illi, qui vult curare infirmes antequam sci at modum
medendi, sicut ibidem Averroes, commentator Aristotelis, sententiat eleganter." Cf. A. C.
Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, 1100-1700 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 140: "Roger Bacon in his major writings on natural science, as in
the Opus Majus, Opus Minus and Opus Tertium, the De Multiplicatione Specierum, and the
Commuflia Mathematica and Communium Naturalium , also first postulated a theory of
science as a means of discovering reality and truth, and then used this methodological theory
in detailed researches undertaken as an illustration of it as well as for their own sakes. In
setting out this theory of science, Roger Bacon, like Grosseteste, began with Aristotle's
Posterior A nalytics and he developed particularly those points to which Grosseteste had
paid attention: the means of arriving at universals or causes by induction and experiment,
and the use of mathematics as the most certain means of demonstrating the connexions
between events."
18Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 4-6 and pp. 43ff. Cf. Daniel Bell, The Reforming of General
Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 158-160. Cf. Joseph Schwab,
The Teaching of Science as Enquiry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 9-14.
19Cf. Aristotle, Posterior A nalytics, Book II, ch. 19, 100a3-8 and Metaphysics, Book I, ch. 1,
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980a23-982a3. Cf. J. L. Lennsn, "The Notion of Experience," The Thomist, XII (1969),
pp.315-344.
200pus Maius, Chapter on Third Prerogative (Bridges), pp. 219-221. Cf.Ibid., p. 211: "Tamen
omnia hujusmodi utilitatis mirificae in republica pertinent principaliter ad hanc scientiam.
Nam haec se habet ad alias, sicut navigatoria ad carpentariam, et sicut ars militaris ad
fabrilem; haec enim praecipit ut fiant instrumenta mirabilia, et factis utitur, et etiam cogitat
omnia secreta propter utilitates reipublicae et personarum; et imperat aliis scientiis, sicut
ancillis suis, et ideo tot a sapientiae speculativae potestas isti scientiae specialiter attribuitur.
Et jam ex istis scientiis tribus patet mirabilis utilitas in hoc mundo pro ecc1esia Dei centra
inimices fidei, destruendos magis per opera sapientiae, quam per arma bellica pugnatorum."
210PllS Maius, VI, 1 (Bridges), p. 168: "Quod ergo dicit Aristoteles quod demonstratio
syllogismus est faciens scire, intelligendum est si experientia comitetur, et non de nuda
demonstratio. Quod etiam dicit primo Metaphysicae, quod habentes rationem et causam sunt
sapientiores expertis, loquitur de expert is qui solum noscunt nudam veritatem sine causa.
Sed hie loquor de experte, qui rationem et acusam novit per experientiam. Et hi sunt perfecti
in sapientia, ut Aristoteles vult secto Ethicorum, quorum sermonibus simplicibus tunc
credendum est ac si afferent demonstrationem, ut dicit ibidem."
220pus Maius, VI, Chapter on Third Prerogative (Bridges) , p. 219-221. Cf. George Sarton.
Introduction to the History of Science, vol. 2 (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1931), p.
953.
23Cf. R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience (New York: Ballantine Books, 1967) , p. 19:
"Social phenomonology is the science of my own and of others' experience. It is concerned
with the relation between my experience of you and your own experience of me. That is,
with interexperience. It is concerned with your behavior and my behavior as I experience it,
and you and my behavior as you experience it ... Natural science is concerned only with the
observer's experience of things. Never with the way things experience us. That is not to say
that things do not react to us, and to each other." Cf. Eugene T . Gendlin, Experiencing and
the Creation of Meaning (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe , 1962).
240pus Maius, VI, 1 (Bridges), p. 168: "Et hoc patet in mathematicis, ubi est potissima
demonstratio. Qui vere habet demonstrationem potissiman de triangulo aequilatero sine
experientia numquam adhaerebit animus conclusioni, nee curabit, sed negliget usque que
detur ei experientia per intersectionem duorum circulorum, a quorum alterutra sectione
ducantur duae lneae ad extremitates lineae datae; sed tunc recipit homo conc1usionem cum
omni quiete."
250pus Tertium, VI (A. G. Little, Ed. , Part of the Opus Tertium of Roger Bacon (Aberdeen:
The University Press, 1912) , p. 43. The context of the quotation is: "Et vocatur scientia
experimentalis, quia per antonomaisiam utitur experientia. Novit enim quod argumentum
persuadet de veri tate, sed non certificat; et ideo negligit argumentum; et non solum causas
rimatur conclusionum per experientias, sed ipsas conc1usiones experitur."
26De Erroribus Medicorum (R. Steele, Ed. , Opera Haclenlls Inedita Fr. Rogeri Baconis, Fasc.
IX, De relardalione accidenlium senectutis cum aliis opllscu/is de rebus medicinalibus, Ed.
by A. G. Little and E. Withington (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928) , p. 170.
27/bid. , p. 170.
28Cf. John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (New York, Longmans,
Green & Co., 1909), p. 37: "Real apprehension, then, may be pronounced stronger than
notational, because things, which are its objects, are confessedly more impressive and affective
than notions, which are the objects of notional. Experiences and their images strike and
occupy the mind, as abstractions and their combinations do not." Cf. Dr. Zeno, John Henry
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Newman, Our Way to Certitude (Leiden: E. I. Brill, 1957), pp. 123ff. Cf. David A. Pailin,
The Way to Faith (London : Epworth Press, 1969), pp. 109-124.
190pus Maius, VI, 1 (Bridges), pp. 167-168: "Positis radicibus sapientiae Latinorum penes
Linguas et Mathematicam et Perspectivam, nunc vole revolvere radices a parte Scientiae
Experimentalis, quia sine experientia nihil sufficienter scire potest. Duo enim sunt modi
eognoscendi, scilicet per argumentum et experimentum. Argumentum concIudit et facit nos
concedere concIusionem, sed non certificat neque removet dubitationem ut quiescat animus
in intuitu veritatis, nisi earn inveniat via experientiae; quia multi habent argumenta ad scibilia,
sed quia non habent experientiam, negligunt ea, nee vitant nociva nee persequuntur bona ...
Sed assumpta experientia combustionis certificatur animus et quiescit in fulgere veritatis.
Ergo argumentum non sufficit, sed experientia."
300pus Maius, VI, 1 (Bridges), p. 169. Cf. text in fn. 15. Cf. Hadeling Hoffmans, "L'experience
chez Roger Bacon," R evue Neo-Sc!lOlastique, XXVII (1925) pp. 170-190.
310pus Maius, VI, 2 (Bridges), p. 173: "Verum est enim quod mathematica habet experientias
universales circa concIusiones suas in figurando et numerando, quae etiam applicantur ad
omnes seientias and ad hane experientiam, quia nulla scientia potest sciri sine mathematica.
Sed si attendamus ad experientias particulares et completas et omnino in propria disciplina
certificatas, necessarium est ire per considerationes istius scientiae, quae experimentalis
auctoritate vocatur." Cf. Stanley L. Iaki, The Relevance of Physics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1966) , p. 124 : " It is well to remember, as Einstein put it, that 'our experience
hitherto justifies us in believing that nature is the realization of the simplest conceivable
mathematical ideas.' Yet, to use his words again, in the actual carrying out of this program
experiments and the observed facts remain 'the sole criterion' and 'the supreme arbiter.'''
32Compendium Studii Philosophiae, 1 (Brewer) , p. 397.
330pus Maius, VI (Bridges) , pp. 167-222. Cf. English translation in Robert B. Burke, The Opus
Maius of Roger Bacon, 2 vols (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1928) , pp.
583-624. Cf. Opus Tertium , 13 (Brewer), p. 43: "Sed praeter has scientias est una perfectior
omnibus, cui omnes famulantur, et quae omnes miro mode certifica t; et haec vocatur scientia
experimentalis, quae negligit argumenta, quoniam non certificant, quantumcunque sint fortia,
nisi simul adsit experientia concIusionis, ut ostendo in tractatu de ista scientia." Cf. Gilles
Meyer, "En quel sens peut-en pa rler de methode scientifique chez Roger Bacon?" Bulletin de
Littlirature Ecc/esiasique, LIII (1952) , pp. 3-25 , 77-98. Cf. R. Steele, "Roger Bacon and
the State of Science in the Thirteenth Century" in Studies in th e History alld M ethod of
Science (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1921) , pp. 121-150. Cf. Lynn Thorndyke, "Roger Bacon
and Experimental Method in the Middle Ages," Philosophical R eview XXIII (1914) , pp.
271-298.
34Cf. Opus Tertium , XIII (Brewer ), p. 43 -44 : "Et ideo haec docet experiri concIusiones nobiles
omnium scientiarum, quae in aliis scientiis aut probantur per argumenta, aut investigantur per
experientias naturales et imperfectas; et haec est una ejus praerogativa ... Alia est dignitas
hujus scientiae quod certificat veritates nobiles in terminis aliarum scientiarum, quae non
possunt ibi probari, nec aliquo modo investigari . . . Tertia vero dignitas istius scientiae est,
quod non recipit veritates in terminis aliarum scientiarum, sed tamen utitur eis sieut
ancilIis." Cf. Opus MaillS VI, 2 (Bridges) , p. 172: "Et haec scientia habet tres magnas
praerogativas respectu aliarum scientiarum."
350pus Maius, VI, (Bridges), pp. 172-201.
360pus Maius, VI, (Bridges) , pp. 202-215.
370pus Maius VI, (Bridges) , pp. 202-215.
380pus Maius, VI, (Bridges) , pp. 215-222. Cf. A. C. Crombie, Augustine To Gallile, The
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History of Science, A.D. 400-1650 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 36:
"Roger Bacon (c. 1214-1294), though he certainly derived the desire for power over nature
as the object of his science, as well as his belief in the occult virtues of stones and herbs,
from the ambitions and assumptions of magic, yet developed a view of scientific experiment
which was perhaps the earliest explicit statement of the practical conception of the aims of
science." C. F. Etienne Gilson, Les metamorphoses de fa cite de Dieu (Louvain: Vrin, 1952),
pp.75-109.
390pus Tertium, 13 (Brewer), p. 46.
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